Employees\u27 Pipe Dream of Free Choice in Representation: Effectuated or Eradicated? (The Midwest Piping Doctrine Revised) by Margulies, Beth Z.
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 33 
Issue 1 Fall 1983 Article 3 
Employees' Pipe Dream of Free Choice in Representation: 
Effectuated or Eradicated? (The Midwest Piping Doctrine Revised) 
Beth Z. Margulies 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Beth Z. Margulies, Employees' Pipe Dream of Free Choice in Representation: Effectuated or Eradicated? 
(The Midwest Piping Doctrine Revised) , 33 DePaul L. Rev. 75 (1983) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol33/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
EMPLOYEES' PIPE DREAM OF FREE CHOICE IN
REPRESENTATION: EFFECTUATED OR ERADICATED?
(THE MIDWEST PIPING DOCTRINE REVISED)
Beth Z. Margulies*
For nearly four decades after its 1945 decision in Midwest Piping and
Supply Co.,' the National Labor Relations Board ("the Board") steadfastly
imposed a duty of strict neutrality upon employers faced with recognition
claims from rival unions.2 This duty, recognized as the Midwest Piping doc-
trine, precluded such an employer from recognizing or negotiating a collec-
tive bargaining agreement with any of the rival unions in an initial organiz-
ing setting until a Board election resolved the representation conflict.3 The
Midwest Piping doctrine was triggered whenever "a real question concern-
ing the representation of the employees" existed.'
Throughout this period, the Board gradually expanded the scope of the
Midwest Piping doctrine, becoming quite liberal in finding the existence of
* Graduate Fellow and LL.M. candidate, Yale University Law School, 1984. J.D., University
of Bridgeport School of Law, 1983; B.A., McGill University, 1976. The author wishes to thank
Julius Getman, Richard Litvin and Jerome Wenig for their helpful guidance and comments.
1. 63 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1945). For a complete discussion of Midwest Piping, see infra text
accompanying notes 12-23.
2. The duty of neutrality, formally adopted in Midwest Piping, was foreshadowed in an
earlier Board decision, Elastic Stop Nut Corp., 51 N.L.R.B. 694 (1943), which involved an
initial organizing situation when no petitions were filed. The Board held that the act of the
employer in signing a contract with the Employees Benevolent Association after the rival Inter-
national Association of Machinists made a claim of majority support and sought recognition
constituted unlawful assistance in violation of his obligation to remain neutral. The Board also
found evidence of employer domination in support of recognition but clearly grounded the
obligation of neutrality and the § 8(a)(l) violation on employer awareness of the rival's ac-
tivities, and not on the other unlawful acts of preference. Id. at 702.
The Board, immediately prior to Elastic Stop Nut, also required employers to remain neutral
with respect to statements made to employees during the period preceding representation elec-
tions. The Supreme Court struck down this requirement on first amendment grounds in NLRB
v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 477 (1941), and permitted employers to express
their views on labor policies or problems. This protection extended to statements of employer
preference for one union over another. Virginia Electric, however, does not cast doubt on the
Midwest Piping doctrine. There is a distinction between employer statements of preference and
an employer contracting with one of two rival unions. Even strongly worded statements of
employer preference do not foreclose the possibility that employees will choose another union.
However, once an employer actually contracts with one union in an initial organizing situation,
he precludes the possibility of employees making a contrary choice. Permitting timely recogni-
tion would give the employer a powerful tool for selecting a favored union.
3. Midwest Piping, 63 N.L.R.B. at 1070.
4. Id. The term "real question concerning representation" was derived from language found
in § 9(c)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, which authorizes the Board to order an elec-
tion "[i]f . . . such a question of representation exists." National Labor Relations Act § 9(c)(1),
29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1976).
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a real question concerning representation.5 As part of this extension, the
duty of neutrality was applied, in an incumbent union situation, to prohibit
the employer from negotiating a new contract with the incumbent once a
real question concerning representation arose.6
Two recent Board decisions, however, drastically restrict the scope of the
Midwest Piping doctrine. Bruckner Nursing Home' held that in rival union,
initial organizing situations, only the filing of an election petition establishes
a real question concerning representation. Thus, until such a petition is filed,
an employer is free to recognize and negotiate with a union representing
an uncoerced, unassisted majority of employees.' RCA Del Caribe, Inc.9 held
that an employer in an incumbent union situation, faced with a representa-
tion petition filed by a rival union, may not withdraw from bargaining with
the incumbent merely because of the filed petition. The- incumbent union
thus retains its preferred status in dealing with the employer. One effect
of these decisions is to allow (or, in the incumbent union context, obligate)
an employer to engage in collective bargaining without awaiting a Board
certified election. More importantly, however, Bruckner and RCA frustrate
the right of employees, guaranteed by the National Labor Relations Act ("the
Act"),'" to select the representative of their choosing.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 25-36.
6. See Shea Chem. Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 1027 (1958). The Board's treatment of the in-
cumbent situation prior to Shea had been inconsistent. The Board's first statement, appearing
in William Penn Broadcasting Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 1104, 1105 (1951), advocated the duty of neutral-
ity for incumbent union cases. Three years later, the Board retreated from this position in
William D. Gibson Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 660 (1954), reasoning that to require withdrawal from
bargaining would stifle negotiations and hinder stability in industrial relations, thereby defeating
the primary objective of the Act. Id. at 662 (citing Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. NLRB, 338
U.S. 355 (1949)). By attempting to avoid disruption in collective bargaining relations, the Gib-
son Board believed that its decision would not interfere with individual free choice of represen-
tation because if a rival union were elected, any collective bargaining agreement it reached
with the employer would supersede the incumbent's agreement. Id. In Shea, decided just four
years after Gibson, the Board insisted on applying the duty of strict neutrality to prevent negotia-
tion of a new contract with an incumbent, stating that "[tlemporary postponement of bargain-
ing relations is not too great a price to pay for the stabilizing effects of an orderly selection
of bargaining representatives in a free atmosphere." 121 N.L.R.B. at 1038. The Board feared
that continued bargaining without an election would establish an inference of employer ap-
proval which could sway employees. But see infra note 150 for a discussion of the contrary view.
The Board in Shea emphasized that this duty of neutrality did not relieve the employer from
administering the terms of existing contracts or processing grievances arising under those con-
tracts. Shea, 121 N.L.R.B. at 1029.
7. Bruckner Nursing Home, 262 N.L.R.B. 955 (1982).
8. Id. at 957-58. Throughout this article, the phrases "petition," "election petition" and
"representation petition" will be used interchangeably in referring to petitions filed to obtain
Board certification under § 9 of the Act.
9. RCA Del Caribe, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 963 (1982).
10. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act states in relevant part:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection. ...
National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
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The decision to permit recognition in the rival union context requires a
careful balancing of the different policies of the Act. The employees' right
to choose their representative freely, safeguarded by the Board's election pro-
cesses, must be weighed against the need to expedite commencement of a
labor-management relationship in order to establish and maintain industrial
stability." Under Bruckner, an employer has a significantly greater oppor-
tunity to contract with the union he favors, precluding a Board supervised
election and thus a contrary employee selection. As a result, the Board has
favored the latter policy at the expense of the former. As this article will
illustrate, that preference is both unwise and unwarranted.
Part I of this article addresses the development and expansion of the
Midwest Piping doctrine and notes conflicts that arose between the Board
and some courts of appeals. Part II sets forth the Bruckner and RCA deci-
sions and the Board's justifications for them. Part III presents a critical
assessment of those decisions and their justifications in light of the purposes
of the National Labor Relations Act.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE MIDWEST PIPING DOCTRINE
A. Midwest Piping and Supply Co.' 2
From 1937, employees at three plants operated by Midwest Piping and
Supply Co., Inc., were represented by the Steamfitters union under con-
secutive "members only" contracts.' 3 As the last such agreement was about
to expire in late 1943, the opposing Steelworkers union won representative
status at one plant pursuant to a Board-supervised election.' 4 Both unions
continued vigorous campaigning at the remaining plants. Each filed represen-
tation petitions with the Board, and each made a demand for recognition
to the employer." While the Steelworkers union would not comply with the
company's request to substantiate its claim of majority status, the Steamfit-
ters union submitted membership cards demonstrating majority support; the
company then entered into a collective, bargaining agreement with the Steam-
11. The controversy over whether to permit recognition was not confined to the Board and
the courts; the controversy was further reflected in the writings of eminent legal scholars. See,
e.g., Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National
Labor Relations Act, 78 HARv. L. REV. 38 (1964); Getman, The Midwest Piping Doctrine:
An Example of the Need for Reappraisal of Labor Board Dogma, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 292
(1964) (assumption that recognition has coercive effect is erroneous).
12. 63 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1945).
13. Id. at 1065. A "members only" contract is one in which the employer grants recogni-
tion only to employees who have voluntarily joined the union; it does not cover all employees
in the bargaining unit. The validity of such contracts has been recognized for many years.
See Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Lion Dry Goods, 369 U.S. 17 (1962); Consolidated Edison
Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938). In a rival union situation, an employer who wishes to
grant a "members only" contract to one union is required to grant similar contracts to each
union so that he does not render illegal support to a favored union in violation of § 8(a)(2)
of the Act. See Sunbeam Corp., 99 N.L.R.B. 546 (1952).
14. 63 N.L.R.B. at 1065.
15. Id. at 1068 & n.ll.
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fitters union.' 6 The Steelworkers union subsequently filed a complaint with
the Board, alleging a violation of section 8(a)(1) of the Act.' 7
The Board held that the employer's execution of a contract with the Steam-
fitters, occurring when the employer knew of the representation petitions
pending before the Board and was aware of the competing union's cam-
paign activities and demand for recognition, violated section 8(a)(1) of the
Act. The Board reasoned that the employer's conduct accorded "unwarranted
prestige" to, and "encourag[ed] membership" in, the Steamfitters union,
in disregard of the employees' section 7 rights.' 8 Thus, the Board established
the doctrine that when a real question concerning representation exists, an
employer must remain neutral until the Board resolves the representation
question through its certification procedures."
The Board offered three justifications for its Midwest Piping decision. First,
it noted that Congress invested the Board with exclusive jurisdiction to resolve
real questions concerning representation when petitions have been filed."
Second, the Board regarded membership cards as inherently unreliable in-
dicators of employee choice.' Finally, the Board reasoned that the over-
riding purpose of the Act-the promotion of industrial peace and stability
through protecting employees' section 7 rights-mandated employer neutrality
during representation disputes. 2 With respect to this last justification, the
Board perceived that a grant of recognition without the benefit of election
processes could lead the employees supporting the unrecognized union to
feel that their right to select their representative was not adequately safe-
guarded. This, in turn, could lead to the application of economic pressure
by the employees, thereby interfering with the employer's business and dis-
rupting industrial peace.23
B. Establishing a Real Question Concerning Representation:
The Trigger of the Duty of Neutrality
In the years following Midwest Piping, the Board and the courts of ap-
peals agreed that the Midwest Piping doctrine applied only when a real ques-
tion concerning representation existed. A controversy arose, however, as to
when a real question existed.2 " The Board viewed situations which could lead
16. Id. at 1068-69.
17. Section 8(a)(1) of the Act states in relevant part:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section [7 to choose their own representatives].
National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
18. 63 N.L.R.B. at 1071.
19. Id. at 1070.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1070 n.13.
22. Id. at 1070.
23. See id. ("such conduct by the [employer] ... leads to those very labor disputes affect-
ing commerce which the Board's administrative procedure is designed to prevent").
24. See infra nots 30-36 and accompanying text.
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to the invocation of Board election processes under section 9(c) of the Act
as creating such a question." By insisting on the use of Board election
machinery to protect employees' rights to choose freely their own represen-
tative, the Board denigrated the reliability of authorization cards.26 Many
courts of appeals, on the other hand, perceived the existence of a real ques-
tion to turn on whether there was a satisfactory showing of majority sup-
port. Those courts held that cards could establish clear proof of majority
support when checked by an impartial body, so that no real question ex-
isted and the duty of neutrality did not attach."
The Board gradually expanded the doctrine's reach by broadening the
category of events which would trigger the duty of neutrality. 8 Initially,
the Board appeared to take the view that the filing of a petition by a rival
union triggered the doctrine.29 Subsequent Board decisions did not rely upon
the filing of petitions to raise a real question concerning representation; the
Midwest Piping doctrine was applied when claims of majority status or
demands for recognition were made, although petitions were not filed.3" Some
25. See Getman, supra note 11, at 293-94.
26. See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
28. Each of the Board's justifications in Midwest Piping for the neutrality requirement calls
for a different triggering event. If one focuses on the facts of the case-both unions filed
petitions, invoking exclusive Board jurisdiction-the expected outcome would be that neutrality
would not be required until a petition is filed. A narrow reading of this sort would also apply
the doctrine only to initial organizing situations and not to incumbent situations. If one focuses
on the justification that membership cards are inherently unreliable, however, a more expan-
sive interpretation follows; then the doctrine would apply in two situations. It would apply,
of course, when petitions have been filed. In addition, it would apply when no petitions have
been filed but a card demand has been made, either by both unions, or by one union if the
employer was aware of the rival's claims. Finally, reliance on the Act's purpose of safeguard-
ing industrial stability invites an even broader application. Card demands, or demands of any
sort, would not be necessary to trigger the doctrine; any time an employer was aware of more
than one union's efforts to organize his employees, strict neutrality would be required.
A feature common to each of the three justifications, however, is that each reinforces the
underlying premise that employees' free choice in representation should be protected by the
Board's election process. The Board election machinery assures employees of a secret ballot.
Disregarding cards as being unreliable indicators of employee preference also protects free choice
by preventing peer pressure and by establishing a time period, known to all, in which unions
have the opportunity to muster adequate support and employees can make an informed choice.
Lastly, the exercise of employee free choice will enhance industrial stability.
29. Some courts of appeals, however, held that the duty of neutrality did not come into
play until the Board ordered an election. These courts would not enforce Board neutrality orders
when petitions had been filed but elections had not yet been ordered. One commentator has
noted that the Board and judicial approaches led to disparate results based on an unnecessarily
fine distinction. See Getman, supra note 11, at 295-96 (whether Board has ordered an election
does not resolve the issue of majority strength). Compare St. Louis Indep. Packing Co. v.
NLRB, 291 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1961) (enforcing Board order when election ordered), with NLRB
v. Swift & Co., 294 F.2d 285 (3d Cir. 1961) (denying enforcement when petitions filed and
election hearings held, but election not yet ordered).
30. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Valve Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 193 (1955) (existence of claim triggers
Midwest Piping doctrine), rev'd on other grounds, 234 F.2d 565 (4th Cir. 1956); 1. Spiewak
& Sons, 71 N.L.R.B. 770 (1946) (request for bargaining triggered duty of neutrality).
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courts of appeals agreed that the absence of a petition did not eliminate
the possibility that a real question existed. These courts, however, held that
an employer's duty to remain neutral turned on the demonstration of ma-
jority support. An employer thus was allowed to recognize one of several
competing unions if that union was able to establish its majority status.3
Moreover, some courts insisted that even a petition, by itself, was not suffi-
cient to create a real question concerning representation when proof of ma-
jority status was presented.32
Ultimately, the Board even dispensed with the requirement that claims or
demands be made by all of the interested unions. In the most ambitious
expansion of the Midwest Piping doctrine,33 the Board in Intalco Aluminum
Corp.3" held that a real question concerning representation existed merely
by virtue of the employer's knowledge of other unions' organizational ac-
tivities when he made a recognition agreement and subsequently signed a
collective bargaining agreement with one union. Although the court did not
disagree with the Board's view that an employer's knowledge of rival union
activities could establish a real question, it again looked to whether the lat-
ter union in fact enjoyed majority support. The court enforced the Board's
order because no cross-check opportunity, necessary to verify a claim of
majority status, had been given to the other unions.3" Thus, the Board
31. See, e.g., NLRB v. Burke Oldsmobile, 288 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1961) (court agreed with
Board that a real question concerning representation existed because there was not a showing
of majority status; handcount expression of majority support was tainted by employer's presence);
NLRB v. Indianapolis Newspapers, 210 F.2d 501 (7th Cir. 1954) (court denied enforcement
of Board order because there was indisputable proof of majority support).
32. See cases cited infra note 99 and accompanying text. The only time the Board would
find that a filed petition was insufficient to establish a real question was when one of the
two unions was effectively defunct so that no real question existed at the time the contract
was executed, Ensher, Alexander & Barsoom, Inc., 74 N.L.R.B. 1443 (1947); or when the bargain-
ing unit was inappropriate, so that the Board dismissed the petition, William Penn Broad-
casting Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 1104 (1951); or when the Board dismissed the petition as untimely
filed-i.e., petitions filed during an election bar period, see Playskool, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. 560
(1972), or during a contract bar period, see Leonard Wholesale Meats, Inc., 136 N.L.R.B.
1000 (1962).
33. Some courts adhered to an equally expansive reading of the doctrine's reach by enforc-
ing Board orders and applying the doctrine in the period pending court review of election cer-
tifications. See NLRB v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 237 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1956) (employer
in good faith was convinced that election was tainted due to coercive union tactics in bitter
campaign rivalry); NLRB v. National Container Corp., 211 F.2d 525 (2d Cir. 1954) (union
filed objections to election). These courts held that the doctrine imposed neutrality until the
collective bargaining representative was fully determined under the Act's procedures. See Kearney,
237 F.2d at 421; National Container, 211 F.2d at 535.
34. 169 N.L.R.B. 1034 (1968), enforced in part and set aside in part, 417 F.2d 36 (9th
Cir. 1969).
35. Intalco Aluminum Corp., 417 F.2d 36, 40 (9th Cir. 1969). But see Playskool, Inc. v.
NLRB, 477 F.2d 66 (7th Cir. 1973), in which the court indicated that no real question concern-
ing representation existed when a union had not renewed its request for recognition since it
lost the last election, even though the employer might have been aware of its continued cam-
paign efforts. Id. at 72. The court denied enforcement of the Board order and permitted the
employer to recognize the union that had presented a verified card majority without participa-
tion of the rival union in the card check. Id.
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gradually expanded the applicability of the Midwest Piping doctrine while
the courts frequently narrowed the scope established by the Board by refus-
ing to enforce its orders. This continuing conflict was in part responsible
for the Board's decisions in Bruckner and RCA. 36
C. The Remedy for Violations of the Midwest Piping Doctrine
Paradoxically, the Board's preoccupation with protecting employee free
choice sometimes caused it to fashion a remedy that seemed inconsistent
with its Midwest Piping objective. The usual remedy was unobjectionable;
it was simply to order the employer 37 to cease and desist from recognizing
a union and to stop giving effect to any agreement reached with that union
until Board certification." In incumbent union situations, the employer was
required to cease bargaining with the incumbent union for a new contract,
but was able to continue administering the collective bargaining agreement
and processing grievances arising under that agreement.39
In certain instances, however, the Board issued a bargaining order. It did
so when an employer unlawfully assisted and supported the union he
favored."0 Yet the use of a bargaining order in a rival union situation had
the effect of allowing the Board to choose the employees' representative., '
36. See Bruckner Nursing Home, 262 N.L.R.B. 955, 957 (1982).
37. After the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Amendments, Labor Management Relations
(Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (1976), the Board also found unions which sought
employer recognition while a real question concerning representation existed to be engaged in
unfair labor practices in violation of §§ 8(b)(1)A and 8(b)2 of the Act. The Board ordered
such unions to cease and desist from enforcing the contracts, from accepting recognition until
after certification, and from attempting to cause the companies to discriminate against their
employees by entering into agreements. See, e.g., Air Master Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. 181 (1963)
(cease and desist order issued); Duralite Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 425 (1961) (same); Jersey Contract-
ing Corp., 112 N.L.R.B. 660 (1955) (same).
38. Also, the employer usually was required to post notices for 60 days, informing employees
of the situation, and to notify the Regional Director of his compliance. See Shea Chem. Corp.,
121 N.L.R.B. 1027, 1030 (1958).
39. See id. at 1029.
40. See, e.g., Flex Plastics, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 651 (1982) (employer encouraged employees
to circumvent union); Lyman Steel Co., 249 N.L.R.B. 296 (1980); Ralco Sewing Indus., 243
N.L.R.B. 438 (1979) (employer fired members of disfavored union); Riviera Manor Nursing
Home, 186 N.L.R.B. 806 (1970) (employer promised benefits for not selecting union), remanded,
200 N.L.R.B. 333 (1972), enforcement denied, 539 F.2d 714 (7th Cir. 1976); Brescome Distrib.,
179 N.L.R.B. 787 (1969) (improper meetings with employees), enforced, 452 F.2d 1312 (D.C.
Cir. 1971). The Board issued the bargaining orders based on NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,
395 U.S. 575 (1969). For a discussion of Gissel, see infra text accompanying notes 121-23.
Interestingly, the Board in a later Riviera Manor decision pointed out that the use of a bargaining
order is inherently inconsistent in situations where petitions have been filed because the filing
of petitions presupposes the presence of a real question concerning representation, and a bargain-
ing order necessarily rests on the absence of such a question. The Board usually dismisses
representation petitions upon issuing a bargaining order. See Riviera Manor Nursing Home,
220 N.L.R.B. 124, 125 & n.9 (1975) (no bargaining order issued) (citing International Hod
Carriers, 135 N.L.R.B. 1153, 1166 n.24 (1962)).
41. In Oil Transport Co., 182 N.L.R.B. 1016 (1970), the Board distinguished between rely-
ing on a card majority in single union situations as opposed to rival union situations, in order
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Thus, if the Board's justification for the Midwest Piping doctrine is pre-
mised on the fact that a pending petition invokes exclusive Board jurisdic-
tion so that employees may choose their own representative, the use of a
bargaining order in those situations is inconsistent with. that justification.' 2
Although it is true that the doctrine was established to preclude the employer
from making that choice, the Board does not safeguard employees' choice
any better by making the decision itself instead of holding an election. There
is no way to discover the employees' true preference by way of a bargaining
order, especially when employers have given unlawful assistance, employees
have signed both unions' membership cards, and there has been no cross-
union card check. Because the employees may not really want the
"unassisted" union, surely the Board ought to weigh this risk against the
section 8(a)(2) findings before issuing a bargaining order.
Sometimes the Board escaped the paradox that resulted from holding a
bargaining order applicable to a rival union situation by stating that the
facts did not present a Midwest Piping dcictrine problem at all.' In those
instances, the Board reasoned that the employer was not faced with rival
claims because he had unlawfully sponsored and assisted the recognized union
in obtaining authorization cards initially.
II. RECENT BOARD LIMITATIONS ON THE MIDWEST PIPING DOCTRINE
Over time, the Board became dissatisfied with the refusal of some courts
of appeals to enforce its Midwest Piping decisions." For at least one year
prior to the Bruckner and RCA rulings, the Board in rival union situations
declined to address Midwest Piping doctrine questions when it was able to
dispose of the cases on other grounds.' It is reasonable to infer that the
to determine whether a Gissel bargaining order was proper. Tensions are far greater in rival
union campaigns and employees are subjected to more pressure, so dependence on cards is
unnecessary and unwise in those instances. The election machinery remains the most reliable
method for verifying employee preference. Id. (quoting Note, The Employer's Duty of Neutrality
in the Rival Union Situation: Administrative and Judicial Application of the Midwest Piping
Doctrine, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 930, 947 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Note, Employer's Duty
of Neutrality]); see also Inter-Island Resorts, Ltd., 201 N.L.R.B. 139 (1973) (Board ordered
new election rather than issue bargaining order), enforcement denied, 507 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1974).
42. The one situation in which a bargaining order might be justified may be seen in NLRB
v. Engelhorn & Sons, 134 F.2d 553 (3rd Cir. 1943), where an employer reached a collective
bargaining agreement with one union while aware that another union had filed a petition. The
agreement was held invalid and an election was held; the rival union won the election and
was certified. Proof of majority status therefore was established in the election, thus justifying
the issuance of a bargaining order consistent with the Midwest Piping doctrine. Id. at 558.
43. See, e.g., Cas Walker's Cash Stores, 249 N.L.R.B. 316 (1980); Sturgeon Electric Co.,
166 N.L.R.B. 210 (1967).
44. See Bruckner Nursing Home, 262 N.L.R.B. 955, 957 (1982).
45. See, e.g., Classic Indus., 254 N.L.R.B. 1149 (1981). The Board in Classic Industries
found that the employer had violated § 8(a)(2) of the Act by rendering unlawful assistance
in the formation of a "Shop Committee," and by negotiating and signing a collective bargain-
ing agreement with the Committee. Id. The Board held that the employer's recognition of the
unlawfully assisted union was a per se violation of the Act, and found it "unnecessary" to
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Board did so because it was reconsidering its position on the neutrality issue
addressed by the expanded Midwest Piping doctrine."" When the Board finally
decided Bruckner and RCA, the result was to curtail that doctrine
significantly.
A. Bruckner Nursing Home'
7
Bruckner is the Board's reevaluation of the Midwest Piping doctrine in
an initial organizing situation involving rival unions. The decision greatly
undercuts the expansion of that doctrine by reverting to the Board's original
Midwest Piping position: in an initial organizing situation, the duty of
neutrality attaches only upon the filing of an election petition by one or
more of the rival unions."5 Thus, Bruckner stands for the proposition that,
in such circumstances, the filing of a petition determines the existence of
a real question concerning representation.' 9
In the spring of 1974, two unions, Local 144, Hotel, Hospital, Nursing
Home & Allied Health Services Union ("Local 144"), and Local 1115, Joint
Board, Nursing Home and Hospital Employees Division ("Local 1115"),
began organizing employees at the employer's nursing home facility. By early
September of 1974, Local 144 claimed majority status based on signed
authorization cards and set a date for verification of the cards."0 Local 1115,
in turn, informed the employer by mailgran of its organizational activities
and requested that he not recognize any other labor organization. Local 1115
also filed unfair labor practice charges against both the employer and Local
144.1' No election petitions, however, were filed by either union.5 2
Verification of the cards indicated that Local 144 represented a majority
of the employees. 53 Despite a request for recognition by Local 144, the
reach the administrative law judge's conclusion that the employer had violated his duty of
neutrality under the Midwest Piping doctrine by bargaining with the Committee in the face
of a rival union demand for recognition. Id.; see also Monfort of Colorado, 256 N.L.R.B.
612, 613 (1981) (Board declined to address Midwest Piping issue because of "overwhelming
evidence" of unlawful employer assistance of one union in violation of § 8(a)(2) of the Act).
46. The Board, at the time it decided Classic Industries and Monfort, had already accepted
RCA for review. See RCA Del Caribe, 262 N.L.R.B. 963 (1982). Both Bruckner and RCA
presented pure Midwest Piping situations, for no other unlawful employer assistance was found
in Bruckner (the Regional Director dismissed the unfair labor practice charges, 262 N.L.R.B.
at 955), and none was alleged in RCA.
47. 262 N.L.R.B. 955 (1982).
48. Id. at 956-57.
49. See id. at 957.
50. Id. at 955.
5 I. Id. Local 1115 alleged that the employer and the union had interfered with the employees'
§ 7 rights to select the union of their choice, the employer in violation of § 8(a)(l) and Local
144 in violation of § 8(b)(l)(A). The charges were subsequently dismissed by the Regional Director.
Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. The card count showed that Local 144 obtained valid authorization cards from 80
to 90% of the 125 employees. Id. Local 1115 had procured only 10 cards, and three of the
10 were from employees who had also signed cards for Local 144. Id. at 960.
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employer refused to recognize or negotiate with the union pending the out-
come of the unfair labor practice charges. In November of 1974, the Regional
Director dismissed those charges. By that time, Local 1115 had acquired
thirteen more cards."' Subsequently, the employer negotiated and executed
a collective bargaining agreement with Local 144. In response, Local 1115
filed further charges with the Board against the employer." In light of the
employer's knowledge of Local 1115's organizational activities and signed
authorization cards, the administrative law judge concluded that the
employer's execution of a collective bargaining agreement with Local 144
constituted unlawful assistance to the latter union in violation of section
8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act.5 6
The Board dismissed the charges against the employer and held that an
employer in an initial organizing situation, faced with claims from rival unions
with no petitions filed, may recognize a union representing an uncoerced,
unassisted majority of his employees.5 Only upon the filing of an election
petition will the duty of strict employer neutrality and nonrecognition at-
tach. Once notified of the filing of a petition, however, the employer must
cease recognition of any of the rival unions. 8
The Board offered two justifications for its decision in Bruckner. First
was the need to reconcile the policy interests of the Act-employee freedom
in the selection of bargaining representatives and facilitation of collective
bargaining-giving "equal consideration to each of those interests in the light
of industrial reality." 9 The Board concluded that the expanded Midwest
Piping doctrine failed to strike the proper balance, and as a result, hindered
the collective bargaining process and frustrated employee free choice.' 0 The
Board reasoned, however, that such a "clearly defined rule of conduct" as
laid down in Bruckner would "encourage both employee free choice and
industrial stability. ' 6 According to the Board, if a union cannot muster
the support of at least thirty percent of the employees (the amount necessary
to file a petition), it should not be able to prevent the employer from
54. Id. at 960. Of the 13 employees who signed cards for Local 1115, nine also signed
cards for Local 144. Id. Because two of the employees who had signed the earlier cards for
Local 1115 left Bruckner's employ before the unfair labor practice charges were dismissed on
November 29, Local 1115 possessed only 21 current cards on that date. Id.
55. Local 1115 alleged violations of §§ 8(a)(1), 8(a)(2), 8(a)(3), 8(b)(1)(A), and 8(b)(2). The
Board dismissed the entire complaint. Id. at 959.
56. Id. at 955.
57. Id. at 958.
58. Id. In order to file a petition, a union must demonstrate the support of at least 30%
of the employees in the bargaining unit. Id. at 957 n.14.
59. Id. at 957.
60. Id. For a discussion of the balancing of these two interests, see supra notes 87-92 and
accompanying text.
61. 262 N.L.R.B. at 957. Deeming the filing of a petition to be the operative event which
triggers the duty of neutrality, the Board opined that this provides employers, employees, and
unions with clear standards for recognizing the existence of a colorable claim by a rival union. Id.
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recognizing a rival union which can demonstrate majority support.6 2 Allow-
ing the employer to recognize the rival in such circumstances, rather than
leaving him to speculate as to whether a real question exists, expedites the
collective bargaining process and encourages industrial stability.63 The Board
thought that requiring neutrality in this situation would result in delay which
would actually frustrate employee free choice. Conversely, the Board noted
that requiring the employer to remain neutral when a union has demonstrated
"substantial support" by way of a valid petition encourages employee free
choice and avoids undue employer influence.6 '
The second rationale offered by the Board was that its decision solved
the dual authorization cards problem, which arises when employees solicited
by rival unions sign cards for both unions.65 The Board retracted its posi-
tion in Midwest Piping that authorization cards in a rival union context are
inherently unreliable indicators of employee choice. Instead, the Bruckner
Board held that, although the problem of dual authorization cards in a rival
union setting must be considered, the existence of such cards alone would
not cause the Board to refuse to allow the employer to rely on cards." The
Board concluded, however, that a union's showing of the thirty percent sup-
port necessary for a petition cast sufficient doubt upon the rival's claim of
majority support to invoke the Board's election machinery for resolution
of the competing claims. 67
62. Id. Although the opinion is not clear as to the effect of a petition filed by an employer,
this, too, should trigger the duty of neutrality. If the employer's petition did not trigger the
duty to withhold recognition, then the result would be to foreclose the possibility that the
duty could ever be invoked once an employer filed a petition. This is so because the Board
would not entertain a union's petition (the triggering event) after it had already ordered an
election based on the employer's petition. Thus, the employer would remain free to recognize
one union until the election outcome resolved the issue. The importance of neutrality in this
context may be demonstrated as follows. Assume that an employer, faced with recognition
claims based on authorization cards from rival unions X and Y, files a petition to resolve
the dispute. Union X then proceeds to exert economic pressure upon the employer in order
to gain recognition. If the employer were not required to remain neutral, he could recognize
union X and greatly undercut union Y's ability to win the election. If the employer favored
union Y, he could engage in "hard" bargaining with union X, thereby encouraging employees
to choose union Y at election time. In either event, a non-neutral employer could significantly
affect his employees' choice.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 958.
65. Id.
66. Id. The Board relied on Linden Lumber Div. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974), and NLRB
v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969), as examples of the Supreme Court's approval
of reliance on authorization cards in other organizational settings. 262 N.L.R.B. at 958. These
two cases are factually dissimilar to the situation in Bruckner, however, because both cases
involved single union situations only. See Linden Lumber, 419 U.S. at 302-03; Gissel, 395 U.S.
at 580, 587.
67. 262 N.L.R.B. at 958.
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
B. RCA Del Caribe, Inc.6"
In RCA, the Board reversed its long-standing requirement of employer
neutrality when an incumbent union is challenged by a rival union.69 In 1974,
the employer and the incumbent union, International Brotherhood of Elec-
trical Workers (IBEW), were operating under a collective bargaining agree-
ment. As the agreement drew to a close, negotiations for a new agreement
commenced. Those negotiations were unsuccessful, and a strike ensued over
the bargaining demands. 7"
During the strike, the rival Union Independiente de Empleados de Lineas
Aereas de Puerto Rico ("Union Independiente") filed an election petition."'
After receiving notice of the petition, the employer refused any further
recognition of or negotiation with the incumbent IBEW. Approximately one
month later, the IBEW submitted to the employer the bona fide signatures
of a majority of the employees, which authorized the IBEW to continue
as their representative. 2 Those employees also signed a petition requesting
the Board to dismiss the election petition, thereby reaffirming their desire
to be represented by the IBEW.73 The employer reopened negotiations with
the IBEW and they arrived at a new agreement which ended the strike.74
The General Counsel for the Board issued a complaint against the employer,
alleging a violation of the duty of neutrality established in Midwest Piping.75
The Board dismissed the complaint, holding that an employer in an in-
cumbent union situation cannot withdraw from bargaining with the incum-
bent merely upon the filing of an election petition by a rival union.76 In
fact, the Board stated that the employer's failure to continue recognizing
and bargaining with the incumbent results in a violation of section 8(a)(5)
of the Act.77 If the rival union wins the subsequent election, however, any
68. 262 N.L.R.B. 963 (1982).
69. Id. at 964-65.
70. Id. at 963-64.
71. Id. at 964. When RCA was decided, the petition had been pending for seven years.
When the Board announced its decision, the Union Independiente withdrew its petition. As
a result, the election was never held and the IBEW remains the bargaining unit representative
at RCA Del Caribe, Inc. Telephone interview with NLRB Regional Director for Puerto Rico
(December 23, 1983).
72. 262 N.L.R.B. at 964. The IBEW had obtained voluntary signatures from 157 employees,
a majority of the 227 bargaining unit employees. The employer verified the signatures by com-
paring them with employer records. Id. However, this method of verification does not include
any prophylactic measure against dual authorization cards. Furthermore, the RCA Board clearly
indicated that it will not require an incumbent union to reaffirm its majority status by submit-
ting cards after a petition has been filed. Id. at 966 n.16.
73. Id. at 964.
74. Id. at 963.
75. Id. at 964.
76. Id. at 965.
77. Id. Section 8(a)(5) states as follows:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . .
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees,
subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title.
National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
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agreement reached between the employer and the incumbent will be void.7"
The Board relied, in part, on a line of cases which held that an incum-
bent union in a nonrival situation enjoys a presumption of majority status."
In order to afford the incumbent the same advantage in a rival union set-
ting, the RCA Board extended that principle to the situation when an elec-
tion petition has been filed by a rival union." The Board rejected its prior
reasoning in Shea Chemical Corp.,8" an extension of the Midwest Piping
doctrine, that prohibiting an employer from negotiating a new contract with
the incumbent was necessarily the best means of ensuring neutrality. Rather,
the RCA Board perceived withdrawal from bargaining as potentially signal-
ling to the employees the employer's rejection of the incumbent and
preference for the rival. Continued negotiations with the incumbent, the Board
concluded, were less likely to signal employer preference. 2 In addition, the
Board saw continued bargaining as enabling the employer to react to chang-
ing economic conditions which require immediate response. 3
The Board regarded the policies of the Act-to ensure employees' free
choice and to facilitate collective bargaining relations-as complementary
elements in attaining industrial stability. 4 Because the Act does not elevate
one policy above the other, it is reasonable to infer that they are to be con-
sidered of equal importance. The Board in RCA did not offer a contrary
view. However, the Board viewed Midwest Piping as protecting employee
free choice to the detriment of stability, thereby elevating the former over
the latter. 5 It seems clear that the Board in RCA anticipated returning the
two policies to parity."
78. RCA, 262 N.L.R.B. at 966.
79. See, e.g., Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 98 (1954) (absent "unusual circumstances,"
Board certification of union must be honored for one year from the date of certification);
United States Gypsum Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 652 (1966) (nonrebuttable presumption of majority
status exists for one year post-certification, while a rebuttable presumption of majority status
exists after that time).
80. 262 N.L.R.B. at 965.
81. 121 N.L.R.B. 1027 (1958).
82. 262 N.L.R.B. at 965.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. To facilitate industrial stability, the Board applied its reasoning from RCA-a filed
petition is not evidence of a real question concerning representation in an incumbent union
setting-in a subsequent decision. In Dresser Indus., 264 N.L.R.B. No. 145, 111 L.R.R.M.
1436 (BNA) (1982), which overruled its decision in Teleautograph Corp., 199 N.L.R.B. 892
(1972), the Board held that the filing of a decertification petition is not evidence of a real
question concerning representation. Instead, according to the Board, the filing of a petition
is merely evidence of minority dissatisfaction. III L.R.R.M. at 1437.
In order to withdraw from bargaining with an incumbent union after the first year of cer-
tification, the employer, under Dresser and RCA, now has the burden of proving that a good
faith, reasonable doubt supported by objective facts exists as to the incumbent's lack of ma-
jority status. Such a showing will overcome the rebuttable presumption of majority status which
inures to the incumbent after its first year as the bargaining representative. Dresser, 111 L.R.R.M.
at 1437; RCA, 262 N.L.R.B. at 965 n.13.
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III. CRITIQUE OF THE BOARD'S LIMITATIONS ON THE SCOPE OF THE
MIDWEST PIPING DOCTRINE
A. Policies of the Act Reconciled
The primary objective of the National Labor Relations Act is to achieve
industrial stability so as not to obstruct commerce. 7 The framers of the
Act recognized that certain practices of labor organizations and employers
led to industrial strife, and that elimination of those practices and the cor-
responding creation of certain rights were necessary to ensure peaceful labor
relations.88 One particular concern was the inequality of bargaining power
between employers and employees. The Act attempted to restore equality
of bargaining power between employers and employees, and thereby achieve
industrial stability, through two complementary policies: protecting employees'
freedom to choose their own representatives and hastening the commence-
ment of collective bargaining relations. 9
The Act does not elevate stability through collective bargaining over preser-
vation of employee free choice as its principal policy. In Bruckner and RCA,
however, the Board appears to have done precisely that, despite its stated
intention to give the two interests edcual consideration.9" It criticized Midwest
Piping as failing to strike a proper balance between these interests by pro-
tecting employee free choice at the expense of expediting collective bargain-
ing. The Board further criticized Midwest Piping as failing in fact to pro-
mote employee free choice. The Board maintained that, in a situation free
of any unlawful employer activity other than a Midwest Piping doctrine viola-
tion, free choice would be either delayed or stifled permanently under Midwest
Piping. According to the Board, the employees' uncoerced and unassisted
choice under such circumstances, shown by authorization cards, would not
be effectuated while election certification was pending. The Board thus
asserted that Bruckner and RCA struck a proper balance between the two
The requirement for establishing a reasonable doubt was set forth in Celanese Corp., 95
N.L.R.B. 664, 673 (1951), and adopted in Dresser. Although Dresser held that a decertification
petition alone does not create a reasonable doubt, it suggested that a petition presented directly
to the employer, demonstrating a showing of majority support for decertification, would create
such a doubt. Ill L.R.R.M. at 1437; cf. Automated Business Sys., 205 N.L.R.B. 532 (1973)
(Board permitted employer to infer loss of majority support from submission of cards by ma-
jority of employees and representations of the petitioners' attorney). By virtue of the ease with
which a card majority can be obtained, however, an employer may withdraw from bargaining
with little difficulty, thereby frustrating RCA 's attempt to preserve the status quo.
87. National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976); see also Colgate-Palmolive-
Peet Co. v. NLRB, 338 U.S. 355, 362 (1949) (primary objective of Congress in enacting the
National Labor Relations Act was to assure stability in labor relations).
88. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
89. See id.
90. See Bruckner, 262 N.L.R.B. at 957; see also Novak Logging Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 1573
(1958), in which the Board explicitly rejected the trial examiner's attempt to reconcile these
interests in accordance with the courts of appeals which had in the past denied enforcement
of Board orders. The Board reserved to itself the authority to balance the Act's policies, absent
a Supreme Court pronouncement on the issue. Id. at 1575-76.
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policies of the Act." On the contrary, however, these decisions appear to
unduly favor the encouragement of expedited collective bargaining at a cost
to employee free choice. The Board's rationale is erroneous in those initial
organizing situations when, between the time a union makes a demand for
recognition based on authorization cards and the time the election is held,
intervening solicitations by a rival union cause changes in union allegiance.
In those instances, it is of equal or greater probability that the employees'
latter decision most accurately reflects their true choice.
It is true that, under Midwest Piping, requiring neutrality when cards are
an accurate indicator of employee sentiment would frustrate employee free
choice and impede collective bargaining. Under those circumstances, neither
policy would be effectuated. But the Midwest Piping Board must have con-
sidered this possibility and determined that the occasions when cards ac-
curately reflect employee desires are simply too infrequent to be significant.
Bruckner implicitly rejected this position and instead found it necessary to
further both policies by permitting recognition. On the other hand, when
cards do not accurately reflect employees' desires, the Midwest Piping doc-
trine protected employee free choice by requiring use of the more trustworthy
election machinery to determine the true representative. The only expense
with respect to the policy of facilitating collective bargaining relations was
to immediate collective bargaining; the long-term interest in promoting mean-
ingful collective bargaining was protected. Bruckner, by permitting recogni-
tion when cards do not accurately reflect employees' choice, frustrates free
choice and impedes meaningful collective bargaining-all for the dubious
gain of immediacy.
B. The Problem of Enforceability
The Bruckner and RCA decisions acknowledged that many courts of ap-
peals consistently denied enforcement of Board neutrality orders.92 Conse-
quently, the Board fashioned its new policies in large part to accommodate
the opinions expressed by those courts.9 3 Yet fundamental flaws exist with
the Board's attempted accommodation. The doctrinal change effected by the
Board is unlikely to achieve the desired result in many situations. Apart from
this failure, the deference shown by the Board to the courts was uncalled for.
Under the Midwest Piping doctrine, the Board imposed a duty of neutrality
whenever a real question concerning representation existed.9 ' As the doc-
trine expanded, the Board found such questions to exist even when no peti-
tions were filed." Some courts of appeals enforced Board neutrality orders
91. Bruckner, 262 N.L.R.B. at 956-57.
92. See id. at 957 ("as often as the Board reaffirmed its adherence to the . . . 'modified'
Midwest Piping doctrine, . . . the courts of appeals refused to enforce our decisions").
93. Id.
94. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
95. See Bruckner, 262 N.L.R.B. at 957, and cases cited therein; see also supra notes 30
and 34 and accompanying text.
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in cases when no petitions were filed,96 as well as when petitions were filed.97
Other courts, however, declined to accept the Board's view of when real
questions concerning representation existed, and thus denied enforcement of
Board orders.98 The basis for the disagreement between the Board (and the
courts that accepted its interpretation) and those courts that did not defer
to the Board stemmed from opposing views regarding the reliability of
authorization cards as a basis for determining majority support in rival union
situations. The Board deemed such cards to be unreliable and insisted upon
elections as the proper means of selecting bargaining representatives. Con-
versely, courts that denied enforcement of Board orders relied upon authoriza-
tion cards as indisputable proof of majority status. Those courts held that
when such support was shown, no real question concerning representation
existed, and thus the duty of neutrality did not attach.
Although the Board in Bruckner and RCA attempted to tailor the Midwest
Piping doctrine so as to gain consistent court enforcement of its orders, the
Board failed to achieve this objective. For example, Bruckner made the fil-
ing of a petition the operative event to invoke the duty of neutrality in an
initial organizing situation. However, a number of pre-Bruckner courts of
appeals decisions did not draw this distinction. Rather, these courts denied
enforcement of Board neutrality orders not because of the absence of a peti-
tion, but because there was clear proof of majority status by one union;
petitions had been filed in some cases99 but not in others.10 Therefore,
Bruckner did not eliminate the possibility that the courts which denied en-
forcement of Board orders when petitions were filed will continue to deny
enforcement, because their view of when a real question concerning represen-
tation exists still differs from the Board's.
A similar result is likely to occur in incumbent situations. The Board in
RCA required continued bargaining with an incumbent, even after a rival
union files a petition. Yet prior decisions in some circuits indicate that courts
might well deny enforcement of Board orders in this context, permitting
employer recognition of a rival union based upon a showing of majority
support. The Third and Seventh Circuits have allowed employers to recognize
96. See, e.g., NLRB v. Western Commercial Transp., Inc., 487 F.2d 332 (5th Cir. 1974),
in which the court enforced the Board's order even though a clear showing of majority support
was demonstrated.
97. See, e.g., American Can Co. v. NLRB, 535 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1976) (court expressly
refused to endorse Board or contrary court views); NLRB v. Allied Food Distrib., 421 F.2d
188 (5th Cir. 1969) (court accepted Board determination that real question existed).
98. See, e.g., NLRB v. Inter-Island Resorts, Ltd., 507 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1974); Playskool,
Inc. v. NLRB, 477 F.2d 66 (7th Cir. 1973); American Bread Co. v. NLRB, 411 F.2d 147
(6th Cir. 1969).
99. See NLRB v. Inter-Island Resorts, Ltd., 507 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1974); American Bread
Co. v. NLRB, 411 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 196); Modine Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 453 F.2d 292 (8th
Cir. 1971); Cleaver Brooks Mfg. v. NLRB, 264 F.2d 637 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
817 (1959); NLRB v. Standard Steel Spring Co., 180 F.2d 942 (6th Cir. 1950).
100. See Playskool, Inc. v. NLRB, 477 F.2d 66 (7th Cir. 1973); Pittsburgh Valve Co. v.
NLRB, 234 F.2d 565 (4th Cir. 1956) (petition dismissed).
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rival unions, upon clear proof of majority status, when no valid petitions
were filed.'' In St. Louis Independent Packing Co. v. NLRB, the Seventh
Circuit stated that, even after an election is ordered, a "clear showing of
majority representation by evidence of a substantial nature" would
demonstrate that no real question concerning representation existed." 2
Similarly, the Third Circuit in Suburban Transit Corp. v. NLRB stated that
when a union has garnered majority support without illegal employer
assistance, "its recognition by the employer . . . [is] precisely the sort of
cooperation that it is the policy of the Act to foster."'0 3 Although the Subur-
ban Transit and St. Louis cases each involved recognition of an incumbent,
there is no basis in the opinions to presume that the same results would
not obtain with respect to rival unions after elections had been ordered. As
these examples reveal, the change in the Midwest Piping doctrine wrought
by Bruckner and RCA does not ensure enforcement of future Board orders.
Contrary to the Board's objective, the enforceability problem remains
unresolved.
Moreover, the primary reponsibility for determining the existence of a real
question concerning representation rests with the Board and not with the
courts of appeals. The standard of review, established by statute and main-
tained in Supreme Court decision, requires enforcement of Board orders if
the Board's findings of fact are "supported by substantial evidence on the
record considered as a whole."'" 4 Further, the Supreme Court has
acknowledged that this standard is not to detract from the Board's function
as an agency equipped with special knowledge; the Board's findings are those
of an expert, the findings of the courts of appeals are not.0 5
Thus, when the Board and a court maintain conflicting views, the court
may not deny enforcement merely because its view is different than that
espoused by the Board. 0 6 It is the judiciary that is to defer to the Board,
101. See NLRB v. Air Master Corp., 339 F.2d 553 (3d Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Indianapolis
Newspapers, 210 F.2d 501 (7th Cir. 1954).
102. 291 F.2d 700, 704 (7th Cir. 1961).
103. 499 F.2d 78, 86 (3d Cir. 1974). There the court held that the filing of a decertification
petition, even when supported by authorization cards from 30076 of the bargaining unit employees,
did not prevent the employer from bargaining with the incumbent union. Id. at 82. The court
relied on Swift, which required that an election be ordered. Id. at 83. (No election had yet
been ordered in Suburban.)
104. National Labor Relations Act § 10(e)-(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)-(f) (1976); see also Univer-
sal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1950) (citing to § 10(e) of the Act).
105. Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 488.
106. Id. Even if the existence of a real question concerning representation is perceived as
a mixed question of law and fact, rather than a question of fact alone, the courts' deference
should remain unchanged. The Supreme Court has held in recent years that the Board is en-
titled to a significant degree of deference with respect to questions of law involving interpreta-
tions of the Act. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 497 (1979) (when the
Board's construction of the Act is "reasonably defensible, it should not be rejected merely
because the courts might prefer another view of the statute"). Moreover, even when courts
have denied enforcement of Board orders, based on a different definition of when a real ques-
tion concerning representation exists, they have followed the Universal Camera standard.
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and not the reverse. Yet it appears that some courts, by holding that cards
are reliable criteria for ascertaining majority support, in effect substituted
their judgment for the contrary view of the Board. The Board's willingness
in Bruckner and RCA to accede to this substitution was an unwise exercise
of its discretion in light of the impact on employee free choice.
C. Unreliability of Cards
The Board in Bruckner offered its decision as a solution to the problems
of dual authorization cards.' 7 Closer examination of the Board's reasoning,
however, reveals the weakness of this position. Contrary to the Bruckner
Board's position, it appears that the expanded Midwest Piping doctrine bet-
ter resolved the problem of dual authorization cards by requiring strict
neutrality, thus rendering the inherently unreliable cards an ineffective means
of obtaining recognition.
Bruckner acknowledged that employees in rival union settings often sign
cards for more than one union.108 Nevertheless, the Board permitted an
employer, absent a petition, to recognize one of the rival unions based on
authorization cards. As a result of Bruckner, the duty of neutrality now
attaches only after a petition has been filed in an initial organizing, rival
union context. This holding was premised on the Board's view that cards
are "less reliable" indicators of a union's majority status when a rival union
has filed a petition than when no petition has been filed.0 9 The Board's
position implies that before a petition is filed, cards are not sufficiently
reliable indicators of employee support to establish the existence of a real
question concerning representation, but that they are reliable enough to
establish majority status and thus allow the employer to recognize a union.
The fallacy of this reasoning is clear, however, for if cards are sufficiently
reliable to establish majority support, a fortiori they should be sufficiently
reliable to establish the existence of a real question concerning majority sup-
port. The Bruckner Board's selective reliance on authorization cards is
especially questionable in light of its admission that there is a high potential
for inaccuracy when dual cards are present and when authorization cards
are used as an indicator of employee preference.' 10 One is hard pressed to
See, e.g., Iowa Beef Packers v. NLRB, 331 F.2d 176, 181 (8th Cir. 1964) (relying on § 10(e));
NLRB v. Trosch, 321 F.2d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1963) (relying on Universal Camera); NLRB
v. Indianapolis Newspapers, 210 F.2d 501, 503 (7th Cir. 1954) (only question is whether facts
"substantially support" Board's conclusion).
107. Bruckner Nursing Home, 262 N.L.R.B. 955, 958 (1982).
108. Id. Dual cards may reflect either shifting employee sentiment as to choice of represen-
tative, or merely a general desire for unionization, without expression of a preference for one
organization over another.
109. Id.
110. Id.; see, e.g., District 65, Distributive Workers of Am. v. NLRB, 593 F.2d 1155 (D.C.
Cir. 1978). District 65 illustrates the unreliability of authorization cards in a rival union context
when dual card signatures prevail. The employer in District 65 unlawfully assisted and recognized
Teamsters Local 806, despite his knowledge that two other rival unions had made demands
for recognition. The employer did not verify the Teamsters' cards, although the rival unions
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see how the Bruckner decision resolves this problem. In contrast, Midwest
Piping's more extensive duty of neutrality offers a more realistic answer to
the dual card problem.
The Midwest Piping Board fully recognized cards as an unreliable factor
in assessing majority support:
[I]t is well known that membership cards obtained during the heat of rival
organizing campaigns . . . do not necessarily reflect the ultimate choice
of a bargaining representative; indeed, the extent of dual membership
among the employees during periods of intense organizing activity is an
important unknown factor affecting a determination of majority status,
which can best be resolved by a secret ballot among the employees. '
Midwest Piping's position of nonreliance upon cards as an expression of
majority support, and its dependence upon the more reliable election pro-
cess thus more fully preserves employee free choice.
The dual card situation is only one of many card problems that recur
in rival union settings, all of which cast doubt on the reliability of authoriza-
tion cards. Other problems include employer intimidation of employees into
signing authorization cards for one union over another," 2 union intimida-
tion of employees into signing authorization cards for one union over
another,"' falsification of signatures, and predating of signed cards.'"' The
Supreme Court has acknowledged the tremendous effect of peer pressure
in a single union setting by stating:
Whatever his true intentions, an employee who signs a recognition slip
prior to an election is indicating to other workers that he supports the
union. His outward manifestation of support must often serve as a useful
tool in the union's hands to convince other employees to vote for the
union, if only because many employees respect their co-workers' views
on the unionization issue."'
had offered to verify their claims. A statistical breakdown of signatures revealed that majority
support could not feasibly exist for any of the unions: of 408 employees, "88 had signed only
with Local 806, 16 only with Local 888, 96 only with District 65, 43 with both 806 and 888,
66 with 806 and 65, 20 with 888 and 65, 36 with all three unions and 43 with none." Id.
at 1162 n.16.
111. Midwest Piping and Supply Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060, 1070 n.13 (1945); see also Novak
Logging Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 1573, 1575 n.7 (1958) (approving language of Midwest Piping).
112. Midwest Piping, 63 N.L.R.B. at 1071.
113. Although Bruckner focused on employer interference, unions are equally capable of
coercing employees in their choice of representative. See, e.g., Note, Union Authorization Cards,
75 YALE L.J. 805, 827 (1966) ("A union organizing by means of authorization cards, is in
at least as effective a position to coerce as is an employer in a secret ballot campaign.").
114. See, e.g., Playskool, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. 560 (1972), enforcement denied, 477 F.2d 66
(7th Cir. 1973).
115. NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 270, 277 (1973). Employees also may sign authoriza-
tion cards without actually reflecting their true sentiments. See, e.g., NLRB v. S.S. Logan
Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562, 565 n.12 (4th Cir. 1967) (some cards are signed to "get the union
off [our] back[s]").
Unions also use, to advantage, the fact that employees are influenced by how others vote.
Therefore, even in single union situations, the manner in which authorization cards are ob-
tained may render them unacceptable. See Marie Phillips, Inc., 178 N.L.R.B. 340 (1969) (although
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The tendency of most persons to seek peer approval and avoid noncon-
formist stances thus contributes to the unreliability of authorization cards.
As the Fourth Circuit noted in NLRB v. S.S. Logan Packing Co.," 6 this
untrustworthiness is enhanced when cards are signed before employees are
exposed to contrary views. Employees who change their minds after such
exposure are unlikely to withdraw their cards;'" 7 consequently, cards col-
lected over a period of time bear little assurance of validity.'" Although
Logan Packing involved only a single union requesting recognition based
on cards, the same concerns exist in a rival union situation. For example,
employees may sign cards for a union that has been organizing for several
months. When another union begins campaigning and offers a more favorable
stance, inducing a change of viewpoint by some of the early signers, the
stale cards may no longer accurately reflect the employees' desires. (This
problem is distinct from the problem of dual signatures because the employees
who have altered their views may not yet have signed authorization cards
for the latter union.) Therefore, it may well be that cards obtained by the
first union to organize do not accurately reflect the employees' choice at
the time a demand for recognition is made by that union. By requiring that
recognition await an election, the Board would ensure that all employees
have time to make an informed choice.
The Bruckner Board viewed its new postion as consistent with and sup-
ported by the Supreme Court's decisions in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.III
and Linden Lumber Division v. NLRB. 20 However, these cases do not lend
support to the legitimacy of recognition based on cards in a rival union con-
text, because both cases involved only single union settings. In Gissel, the
court delineated two instances when a bargaining order, and not an elec-
tion, would be an appropriate remedy for employer unfair labor practices:
exceptional cases involving outrageous and pervasive unlawful conduct,'
and less serious cases involving less pervasive practices, when the union
achieved a card majority at some point and when the Board concluded that
the extensiveness of the unlawful conduct had a "tendency to undermine
majority strength and impede the election processes."' 2 The presence of
Board presumed that employees express their individual opinions, it allowed for invalidation
of cards when the signers relied on union misrepresentations as to union strength), enforced
sub nor. Local 153, ILGWU v. NLRB, 443 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S.
905 (1971); accord NLRB v. Roney Plaza Apts., 597 F.2d 1046, 1053 n.16 (5th Cir. 1979);
Medline Indus. v. NLRB, 593 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1979); Schwarzenbach-Huber Co. v. NLRB,
408 F.2d 236, 241 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960 (1969); NLRB v. Dan Howard Mfg.
Co., 390 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. H. Rohtstein and Co., 266 F.2d 407, 409 (1st
Cir. 1959). These cases illustrate just how easily employees sign cards that may not actually
reflect their true sentiments. If there is a legitimate reason to distrust cards in single union
situations, surely there is greater reason to justify distrust in rival union situations.
116. 386 F.2d 562, 566 (4th Cir. 1967).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
120. 419 U.S. 301 (1974).
121. Gissel, 395 U.S. at 613-14.
122. Id. at 614.
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employer unfair labor practices in a single union situation undermines the
effectiveness of the election machinery from the outset. In that case, the
Board must rely on cards, because it has no other means to gauge employee
support. In rival union situations when employer unfair labor practices are
not present, there is no reason to fear that an election will be tainted. Thus,
there is no need to rely on cards. Moreover, the Supreme Court has stated
that, absent employer unfair labor practices, the Board's election machinery
is the preferred means of discerning employee sentiment. 2 3 Therefore, the
Supreme Court's acceptance of cards as indicating majority support in single
union situations with attendant unfair labor practices cannot justify reliance
on cards to establish majority support in rival union situations without un-
fair labor practices.
The Supreme Court in Linden Lumber Division v. NLRB 24 only partially
supported the Board's reliance on cards as indicators of employee sentiment.
In Linden Lumber, the Court permitted the employer the option of recogniz-
ing a union on the basis of cards in a single union situation. There is likely
to be a significant difference between allowing the option in a single union
situation and allowing it in a rival union situation, because "an employer
is more likely to favor one union over another than to favor one [union]
over none."'2 3 Furthermore, Linden Lumber in fact appears to support the
notion that cards are unreliable as indicators of employee preference. The
Linden Lumber Court, by permitting an employer to refuse a recognition
request supported by cards, acknowledged that an employer may have
"rational good faith grounds for distrusting authorization cards in a given
situation."'26
The Board in Bruckner and RCA also failed to require employers to
observe a procedural formality which would, at least to some degree, help
guarantee that employee free choice is maintained. Neither decision insisted
that an employer afford the unrecognized rival union an opportunity to sub-
mit its cards for cross-checking at the time the recognized union's cards are
verified. Rather, the Board merely cautioned the employer to verify the
signatures submitted by the recognized union, so as not to recognize er-
roneously a minority union.'2 7 Yet the Board previously had held that an
independent verification check of employees' signatures against the employer's
payroll list was insufficient to establish a majority claim because it failed
to protect adequately against forgeries, predatings, and the possibility of dual
signatures.' 28 On that occasion, the Board observed that majority support
123. Id. at 602.
124. 419 U.S. 301 (1974).
125. Getman, supra note 11, at 304 n.45.
126. Linden Lumber, 419 U.S. at 306. The Court placed the burden on the union to file
a petition in order to establish representative status once the employer refused recognition.
Id. at 309.
127. Such recognition, even if inadvertent, would violate § 8(a)(2) of the Act. Bruckner,
262 N.L.R.B. at 957 n.13 (citing ILGWU v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961)).
128. Playskool, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. at 561 n.8 (1972), enforcement denied, 477 F.2d 66 (7th
Cir. 1973).
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could have been determined if the employer had provided for participation
by both unions in the card verification, which would have helped reduce
the dual card problem.'29 The Bruckner-RCA Board offered no explanation
for omitting this prophylactic measure.
The Supreme Court ruled in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.3 '
that "the right of employees to self-organization . . . is often an essential
condition of industrial peace,"' 3 ' and that "collective action would be a
mockery if representation were made futile by interference with freedom of
choice."' 32 Sanctioning recognition based on cards at the expense of free
choice, merely to gain immediacy in collective bargaining relationships, makes
collective bargaining meaningless. Recognition based on card counts may
neither accurately reflect nor adequately protect employees' exercise of their
freedom of choice.
D. Significance of Recognition
In both initial organizing and incumbent union situations, an employer's
recognition of one of the competing unions may have a significant impact
on the employees' ultimate choice of bargaining representative. Recognition
prior to an election affords the employer substantial power to manipulate
that choice. In the initial organizing context, this may be accomplished by
the employer's choice of which union he desires to recognize, the manner
in which he bargains with that union, and the timing of recognition. In the
incumbent setting, the employer's influence is exerted by the manner in which
he bargains with the incumbent.
1. Initial Organizing Setting
In an initial organizing situation, Bruckner permits an employer to
recognize the one of two rival unions that represents an uncoerced majority
129. Id. at 561. The Board cited to Intalco Aluminum Corp., 169 N.L.R.B. 1034 (1968),
enforced in part and set aside in part, 417 F.2d 36 (9th Cir. 1969), for the proposition that
without a cross-check with the rival union, cards cannot be "an accurate barometer of employees'
sentiments." On appeal, however, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that although
the better practice would be to obtain the rival union's participation in the card check, failure
to do so would not preclude recognition. Playskool, Inc. v. NLRB, 447 F.2d 66, 71 (7th Cir.
1973).
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit has required such a cross-check opportunity before enforcing
Board orders. See, e.g., Buck Knives, Inc. v. NLRB, 549 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1977) (incumbent
union setting); NLRB v. Fishermen's & Allied Workers' Union, 483 F.2d 952 (9th Cir. 1973)
(initial organizing setting); Intalco Aluminum Corp. v. NLRB, 417 F.2d 36 (9th Cir. 1969)
(initial organizing setting).
One commentator has advocated verification of cards against rival unions' cards as a solu-
tion to the dual signatures problem on the theory that it is more likely for a union man to
sign two authorization cards than for an anti-union man to sign one. See Getman, supra note
11, at 303.
130. 301 U.S. 1 (1936).
131. Id. at 42.
132. Id. at 34.
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of employees, until a petition is filed. Because recognition does not bar the
filing of a petition by a rival union,'33 it does not completely eliminate the
possibility of a contrary employee selection through the election process. The
element of timing in granting or refusing recognition, however, is a power-
ful tool with which an employer, under Bruckner, can substantially influence
the employees' choice or even effectively destroy the strength of a disfavored
union. If the employer favors the union that presents him with the first de-
mand, an early recognition can be made by the employer. This timely recogni-
tion may effectively bar the rival union from gaining enough support to
file a petition. On the other hand, if an employer dislikes the union that
made the first demand, he may refuse that union's request and later recognize
a second union that is more to his liking.' 34 In either event, the fact that
recognition is terminated by the filing of a petition does not eliminate its
influential nature.
One commentator has highlighted the very real impact of preelection
recognition which may occur in an initial organizing situation.'33 First,
employees may believe that the employer favors the recognized union, and
thus they might be more inclined to side with that union when they actually
vote. 3 6 Whether the employer actually favors that union is of little conse-
quence; it is the employees' inference, drawn from the act of recognition,
which is important.'37 Second, the recognized union may gain a further tac-
tical advantage by acquiring the psychological prestige of being a "winner."38
This advantage is especially evident when the recognized union was faring
well, during prepetition bargaining, in obtaining concessions from the
employer. 39 Employees may decide not to forfeit "the bird in the hand"
133. See Mojave Elec. Corp., 210 N.L.R.B. 88 (1974) (recognition is no bar to petition when
opposing union is actively engaged in organizing) (citing Sound Contractors Ass'n, 162 N.L.R.B.
364 (1966)).
134. This is exactly the scenario which frequently occurred prior to Midwest Piping, and
which Midwest Piping sought to prevent. See Bruckner Nursing Home, 262 N.L.R.B. 955,
956 (1982). Getman stated that an employer who makes a timely recognition with intent to
manipulate would violate the Act, and that the courts of appeals would probably agree with
this view. Getman, supra note 11, at 304.
135. See Note, Employer's Duty of Neutrality, supra note 41.
136. Id. at 932.
137. See, e.g., Kaynard v. Cowles Communications, 66 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2052 (1967). The
district court in Kaynard recognized this result as being a serious infringement on employee
free choice. During the founding of a daily newspaper, the International Typographical Union
(ITU) proposed a single union for all employees rather than separate unions for each craft,
which was the industry norm. Management collaborated with the ITU, conducting an active
campaign aimed at hiring employees who would accept ITU membership. Id. at 2059. Prospec-
tive employees undoubtedly interpreted the employer's preference as a prerequisite to employ-
ment. The court enforced the Board's request for injunctive relief "[i]n view of the irreparable
harm which the designated unions may suffer by the drifting away of their membership to
the union favored by the employer .. " Id. at 2067. For a discussion of the inference gleaned
from employer dealings with incumbent unions, see infra note 150.
138. Note, Employer's Duty of Neutrality, supra note 41, at 932.
139. Id. at 933. An employer who favors the recognized union might make concessions in
order to promote membership in that union prior to an upcoming election. But such conces-
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for an unknown union with unknown abilities.' °
Preelection recognition also aids the employer in obtaining favorable con-
tract terms. Once a collective bargaining agreement exists, the contract bar
doctrine precludes the filing of a petition for the life of the agreement, ex-
cept during a specified period.'' The recognized union thus has a great in-
centive to reach such an agreement as quickly as possible, thereby protect-
ing its status as the bargaining representative. This incentive is especially
strong when the union fears its rival's organizing abilities. In its haste to
conclude a collective bargaining agreement, the recognized union might well
make substantial concessions detrimental to the best interests of the
employees. Under the prior expanded Midwest Piping doctrine, the incen-
tive for hastily reaching an agreement was dissipated by the employer's duty
of neutrality, which precluded recognition until an election was held. Thus,
prior to Bruckner, the Midwest Piping doctrine fostered an environment in
which collective bargaining efforts were untainted by the inferences and ef-
fects of an employer's recognition.' 2
2. Incumbent Union Setting
The RCA decision imparts great powers of manipulation to employers in
an incumbent context as well. Even after a timely petition is filed, RCA
requires an employer to continue bargaining with the incumbent until the
election is held.'" As a result, employees have a viewing period during which
they may monitor the incumbent union's success at the bargaining table before
they select their representative by election. " Allowing continued recogni-
tion after a petition has been filed also bestows an unfair advantage on the
incumbent by granting it an exclusive opportunity to obtain a favorable
contract.' 5 The nonrecognized union has no equivalent opportunity to
sions may not be inordinately favorable because the employer knows that he is bound by them
in the event that the union is certified. See Bok, supra note 11, at 118.
Recognition may not necessarily work to the advantage of the recognized union either. For
example, when the recognized union is not dealing well with the employer, the employees may
infer that the rival union will be better able to communicate with the employer and thereby
obtain greater benefits. Alternatively, if the employer does not favor any union but chooses
to recognize one because he does not want to be subjected to economic pressure, the employer
may take a hard line approach during bargaining in an attempt to scare off membership.
140. Note, Employer's Duty of Neutrality, supra note 41, at 932.
141. To be timely, petitions must be filed between 90 and 60 days before expiration of a
collective bargaining agreement. See Retired Persons Pharmacy v. NLRB, 519 F.2d 486 (5th
Cir. 1975); Leonard Wholesale Meats, 136 N.L.R.B. 1000, 1001 (1962).
142. Midwest Piping achieved this result without imposing an undue burden on the employer.
Because elections are generally held within 30 days of the filing of petitions, see infra note
152, employers are faced with little delay when recognition is prohibited until that time.
143. RCA Del Caribe, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 963, 965 (1982).
144. It is true that employees will already have had an opportunity to observe employer-
incumbent negotiations-those resulting in the existing contract. But the injection of a rival
union, and the employer's attitude towards that union, into the scenario may render prior bargain-
ing history irrelevant.
145. Unlike initial organizing situations, an incumbent union in a rival situation has no in-
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demonstrate to the employees what it might have achieved. The potential
for an employer to take advantage of this viewing period by the manner
in which he negotiates is great.
Board Member Van de Water, in his dissent in RCA, pointed out just
how extensive this manipulation can be by asserting that an employer may
prefer the rival union over the incumbent.', In such a situation, the employer
will then engage in hard bargaining in an effort to convince the employees
that the incumbent is ineffective, thereby encouraging the employees to shift
their support to the rival.'"7 Similarly, the potential for manipulation also
exists when the employer prefers the incumbent; the employer then may of-
fer substantial concessions during negotiations in the hope of solidifying
employee support for the incumbent.'"8 Should the rival later win, the
employer's grant of favorable concessions is not binding; any benefits gained
under the incumbent contract would be forfeited, unless the rival union would
be able to negotiate equivalent or better terms.' 9 Hence, the employer is
in the unique position of either being successful in his choice of union, or
being able to avoid whatever concessions he granted the subsequently defeated
union. The rival union would likely be defeated, however, due to the
favorable inferences drawn from the act of continued bargaining, the man-
ner of negotiations, or the employees' fears that the rival could not obtain
equally favorable benefits." 0
Furthermore, even if the employer does not desire to remove the incum-
centive to bargain hastily in order to preserve its bargaining representative status; the employer
must continue negotiating with the incumbent even after a rival petition is filed. Thus, rather
than make unwise concessions, the incumbent will seek victory in the election by bargaining
as effectively as possible on behalf of the majority of employees.
146. RCA, 262 N.L.R.B. at 968 (Van de Water, Member, dissenting).
147. Id. at 967-68 (Van de Water, member, dissenting).
148. Id. at 968 (Van de Water, member, dissenting).
149. When the rival union wins an election after the incumbent has obtained benefits through
its negotiating efforts, RCA may greatly disadvantage the employer by enabling the rival union
to start negotiations from the higher floor set by the incumbent's prior negotiations.
150. Some commentators question whether employees will perceive continued bargaining with
an incumbent as an employer's statement of preference and, if they do, whether their vote
will be influenced accordingly. Getman asserts that continued bargaining with the incumbent
is not likely to imply anything more than habit or an employer's sense of duty. Getman, supra
note 11, at 299-300, 304. Rather, it is more likely that an employer's withdrawal from bargain-
ing with an incumbent will be interpreted as casting disfavor upon the incumbent. Id. at 300.
Even though Freeman acknowledged the force of Getman's assertions, he also recognized that
employer manipulation at the bargaining table can exert undue influence; this possibility justifies
the continued application of the prior Midwest Piping doctrine. Note, Employer's Duty of
Neutrality, supra note 41, at 937. Getman counters with the claim that today's employees are
sufficiently sophisticated so as not to be easily coerced or influenced by recognition. Getman,
supra note 11, at 309. Bok goes a step further, viewing negotiations as having little, if any,
greater effect on employee choice than an open declaration of employer preference, an avenue
open to the employer even before Bruckner and RCA. Bok, supra note 11, at 119 (citing Rheem
Mfg. Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 404 (1955)). However, it is more reasonable to think that employees
will be better able to evaluate differing union views in an atmosphere untainted by possible
inferences of employer preference.
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
bent, he still may hesitate to execute a contract with that union for fear
that negotiations would recommence if the rival union won. As Member
Van de Water's dissent noted, requiring continued bargaining with the in-
cumbent in this situation is a "waste of time, and . . . energy .. .which
could be of no benefit to the employer, union or employees."' 5 ' In con-
trast, the expanded Midwest Piping doctrine eliminated the viewing period
and thereby avoided this possibility of employer manipulation. If the
employees ultimately chose to retain the incumbent, the delay in collective
bargaining caused by the expanded Midwest Piping doctrine was minimal.'5 2
On the other hand, if the employees selected the rival union as their represen-
tative, the doctrine actually expedited the commencement of collective bargain-
ing between the employer and the true employee representative, without the
waste of time and energy expended in bargaining with the incumbent.
Recognition without an election effectively undermines employee free choice
by affording the employer the power to influence the employees' choice of
representative. Bruckner and RCA render the subsequent election substan-
tially less meaningful, because employees may be reduced to voting based
on their perception of the employer's wishes rather than their own preferences.
Certainly, this does not comport with the policies expressed in the National
Labor Relations Act.
E. Union's Use of Economic Pressure
Although the Bruckner and RCA decisions adversely affect employee free
choice, a significant disadvantage may accrue to employers as well. The finan-
cial burden on employers would be substantial if one or both unions could
strike, boycott, or picket to force recognition while the employer was under
a duty to remain neutral. Recognizing the union that exerts economic pressure
would subject the employer to an unfair labor practice charge by the oppos-
ing union, while refusing to recognize could lead to serious financial detri-
ment from the economic pressure. The pre-Bruckner Board, while recogniz-
ing this burden, nonetheless found this use of economic pressure to be pro-
tected activity.
In Hoover Co.,' the employer refused to continue recognition of the
151. RCA, 262 N.L.R.B. at 967 (Van de Water, Member, dissenting).
152. Statistics support the contention that, in the majority of cases, the delay involved in
awaiting an election is minimal. Elections generally are held within 30 days after the filing
of the petition. In the small percentage (1707o) f cases when objections to the petitions cause
delays, 9107o f the delays are less than 60 days (180 days if an appeal is filed). Delays due
to unfair labor practice charges are also insignificant; 8407o f such charges are dismissed within
30 days, and 80076 of the remainder are settled within 180 days. Note, Employer's Duty of
Neutrality, supra note 41, at 934 n.21. Thus, the generally slight delay occasioned by the waiting
period before an election produces only slight interference with employee choice and the collec-
tive bargaining process. Furthermore, the delay may even provide a measure of additional pro-
tection to the employees by affording the opportunity to conduct hearings designed to resolve
questions regarding appropriate bargaining units.
153. Hoover Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1614 (1950), enforcement denied, 191 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1951).
The Board's position in Hoover was advocated by several courts before the Midwest Piping
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incumbent union upon the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement
due to the union's failure to comply with certain filing requirements.' 5 In
response, the union initiated a strike and a consumer boycott in support
of its claim for recognition. Seven weeks after the strike began, the employees
returned to work, but the employer suspended the strikers because of the
continuing boycott. Meanwhile, a second union had filed a petition and won
a consent election.'" The Board held that the employer's suspension of the
strikers constituted section 8(a)(3) and section 8(a)(1) violations by finding
that the boycott was protected activity.' The employer argued that the
boycott could not be protected activity because succumbing to its pressure
would require him to violate the Midwest Piping doctrine, and thus the Act.
This position was rejected by the Board, which stated that such a violation
was not a certainty."'
In denying enforcement of the Board's order, the Sixth Circuit in Hoover
found the boycott to be unlawful activity in "direct interference with the
Board's election procedures and with the right of employees to select bargain-
ing representatives of their own choosing.""' Endorsing the duty of neutral-
ity, the court found the union guilty of an unlawful act because it was forc-
ing the employer to violate the National Labor Relations Act.' 9
Under the Midwest Piping doctrine as modified by Bruckner, there is a
greater possibility that an employer may be faced with actual and substan-
tial economic pressure prior to the filing of a petition. Because Bruckner
does not require recognition, but merely permits it, an employer may right-
fully withhold recognition from either union and be subjected to the resul-
decision. As one court stated, "economic hardships imposed upon an employer as a result
of jurisdictional labor disputes do not excuse the employer from compliance with the Act."
NLRB v. Engelhorn & Sons, 134 F.2d 553, 557-58 (3d Cir. 1943) (quoting NLRB v. Hudson
Motor Car Co., 128 F.2d 528 (6th Cir. 1942)).
154. Hoover, 90 N.L.R.B. at 1615. The filing requirements have since been deleted from
§ 9 of the Act. See Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, § 201(d), 29
U.S.C. § 431 (1976) (repealing National Labor Relations Act § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159(h)).
155. Because the incumbent did not comply with filing requirements it could not be placed
on the ballot. See supra note 154.
156. Hoover, 90 N.L.R.B. at 1619.
157. The employer based his contention on the Board's rulings in Thompson Prods., Inc.,
72 N.L.R.B. 886 (1947), and American News Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 1302 (1944), which found strike
activity unprotected when its object was to cause, with certainty, a violation of labor law by
an employer. The Board distinguished those cases from Hoover by stating that the Hoover
situation did not involve a "certain" violation of the Midwest Piping doctrine. It noted that
there was a chance that a question concerning representation would no longer exist by the
time the employer recognized one union; the rival might withdraw its petition, or the employer
might grant "members only" contracts. 90 N.L.R.B. at 1618.
158. Hoover Co. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 380, 386 (6th C2ir. 1951).
159. Id. The Second Circuit reached a result similar to that in Hoover. See NLRB v. Elec-
tronics Equip. Co., 205 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1953). At issue in Electronics Equipment was the
sending of certain letters soliciting a boycott in the event of a strike. The Board had found
the activity to have the unlawful objective of obtaining an exclusive bargaining contract for
the union during the pendency of a representation petition. Thus, the court found no § (8)(a)(3)
violation when the employer discharged the employees who sent the letters. Id.
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tant economic pressure. 6 Under those circumstances, exertion of economic
pressure by the union is lawful; it does not have the objective of compelling
the employer to violate the Act. Consequently, the courts will sustain Board
orders in the event of employer appeals. Therefore, employers faced with
such economic pressure can no longer look to the courts to alleviate that
burden. In contrast, under the prior Midwest Piping doctrine, employer ap-
peals for judicial relief were more successful. Although a pre-Bruckner
employer also faced the burden of a lengthy and expensive appeals process,
plus the union's economic pressure while the appeal was pending,' 6' the
burden imposed by the Bruckner decision is considerably greater. Therefore,
because the Board no longer requires neutrality in initial organizing situa-
tions when no petition has been filed, economic pressure increases the poten-
tial burden on employers.
Unfortunately, while the Supreme Court has considered the use of such
economic pressure in a single union setting, 6" it has not settled the issue
in a Midwest Piping context.' 3 Thus, after Bruckner, the Board and the
courts of appeals remain in conflict as to the lawfulness of union economic
pressure after a petition is filed in an initial organizing situation. "
In contrast, the RCA decision serves to lessen the potential burden on
employers in rival union settings when an incumbent union is functioning.
Prior to RCA, the Board would allow a rival union to use economic pressure
to protest an employer's signing of a contract with an incumbent union.
Such activity on the part of the rival union would have been protected by
the Board as a reaction to an unfair labor practice, because the employer would
160. A noncertified union may lawfully picket for up to 30 days before it is required to
file a petition. National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(7)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976). Once a
petition is filed, the duty of neutrality comes into play. Bruckner Nursing Home, 262 N.L.R.B.
955, 957 (1982).
161. Two deterrents might diminish even the lesser burden associated with the prior Midwest
Piping doctrine. First, an employer may permanently replace employees participating in an
economic strike. See NLRB v. MacKay Radio and Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). Economic
strikes include those instituted in support of bargaining demands or requests for recognition.
R. GORMAN, BAsIc TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 339 (1976).
Second, union awareness that courts would find activity which pressured an employer to violate
the Act unlawful may well constitute an effective deterrent, so as to avoid the economic pressure
in the first place.
162. See, e.g., Linden Lumber Div. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974). Linden Lumber involved
a single union setting, in which the union struck the employer after it was refused recognition,
despite presentation of a card majority. The Court did not hold the strike to be unlawful,
but neither did it find a § 8(a)(5) violation by the employer. Id. at 309-10.
163. In Ohio Ferro-Alloys Corp. v. NLRB, 213 F.2d 646 (6th Cir. 1954), the Sixth Circuit
adhered to its earlier decision and found a recognitional strike and associated picketing in a
rival union context to be illegal activity. Id. at 651. Nevertheless, the Board reaffirmed its
Hoover position as recently as 1978. See St. Regis Paper Co., 232 N.L.R.B. 1156 (1978).
164. The Board-court conflict may be exacerbated if the issue arises in a circuit which holds
that a petition will not establish a real question concerning representation if there is clear proof
of majority support. If the picketing union demonstrates majority support, a court in such
a circuit may find the pressure to be lawful. Conversely, if the union does not demonstrate
majority support, the picketing would probably be held to be unlawful.
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have violated the Midwest Piping doctrine by negotiating with the incum-
bent in the face of a rival petition. 6 ' By requiring continued bargaining with
incumbent unions, however, the RCA Board effectively eliminated this use
of economic pressure. Employers will not commit an unfair labor practice
by bargaining with the incumbent; consequently, any economic protest by
the rival union will not be protected.
CONCLUSION
By limiting the Midwest Piping doctrine, the Bruckner Board failed to
adequately protect employee free choice. The elimination of the duty of
neutrality when an employer is aware of rival unions' organizational activities,
but no petition has yet been filed, affords the employer a powerful tool
with which to manipulate the choice of representation. Similarly, RCA, by
mandating continued bargaining with the incumbent, provides the employer
an equally clear opportunity to influence his employees' decision. A return
to the expanded Midwest Piping doctrine is clearly needed. Any slight delay
which that doctrine might entail in bringing about a meaningful labor-
management relationship will not threaten industrial stability sufficiently to
warrant interference with employees' free choice.
165. See, e.g., Suburban Transit Corp., 203 N.L.R.B. 465, 471 (1973). The court
of appeals, on the other hand, thought that the petition did not create a real question concern-
ing representation in light of the fact that the incumbent demonstrated a clear showing of
majority support, and thus did not trigger the employer's duty of neutrality. Accordingly, the
court deemed the signing of the contract lawful. Suburban Transit Corp. v. NLRB, 499 F.2d
78, 82-83 (3rd Cir. 1974).
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